Fifteen Eighty Four

In the hit 2018 film ‘Black Panther’ a scene at the United Nations (UN) revealed a flag proudly flying the Welsh dragon among the litany of other UN member states. Although probably a mix-up in the props department, the presence of Wales in the UN, at least in the Marvel Universe, prompted a minor debate online: Could a region, with no international sovereignty, become a member-state of an international organisation?

The question may seem somewhat ridiculous by today’s standards. John Darwin had called the UN from the 1960s era of decolonization onwards an ‘arena of international affairs par excellence in which new international identities could be paraded and displayed’. However, the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, contained several member states that were far from fulfilling today’s expectation of full sovereignty. Britain’s autonomous settler colonies, the Dominions, notably Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. But perhaps more anomalous was the membership of a British colony that had little autonomy or claim to sovereignty; British India.

The presence of British colonies at the League of Nations poses four significant questions about the relationship between membership in international organisations and sovereignty:

1. Did the accession of colonies create new norms towards colonial membership, and were they carried forward into the United Nations?
   
2. Was it normatively acceptable in 1919 for colonies to participate in international organisations and on what basis were they able to join?
   
3. To what extent were colonial delegates free to represent their polity, and whether membership encouraged a sense of nation-building?
   
4. Why were the British the only imperial power at the League of Nations to allow their colonies to join and what does it say about the politics of the British Empire?

An anomaly among anomalies?

The first question was already highly contested even in its day. The League of Nations was formed during the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the First World War, and different countries, notably Britain and the United States had opposing views on the entry of British colonies. The American legal advisor at Paris, D.H Miller, called the entry of India and the Dominions ‘An anomaly among anomalies!’, making it clear that for the Americans, colonial membership was certainly a significant deviation from the norm.

Yet many of the precursor organisations to the League did contain colonies. The first true international organisations in the modern sense that emerged in the mid-19^th century, the International Telegraph Union (ITU, 1865) and Universal Postal Union (UPU, 1874) contained a litany of European colonies. For European Empires, the one-seat one-vote system did not reflect the political realities of the world, as they competed to enter their colonies. The participation of colonies at international institutions and conferences hardened as the rise of the United States at the turn of the 20^th century began to solidify the prerequisite for state sovereignty at international gatherings.

At Paris, the United States initially opposed the entry of British colonies to both the peace conference as entities separate from Britain, and as eventual members of the League of Nations. It was only after considerable lobbying of President Woodrow Wilson that a loophole was created, allowing these colonies to join by virtue of signing the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty with Germany. This exempted founding members from requiring sovereignty or even self-governance, but it seemed to have closed the door to the accession of future European colonies. Nonetheless, Article 1 of the League’s Covenant, its constitution similar to today’s UN Charter, allowed membership to any ‘Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony’, a seemingly paradoxical statement, but one that would prove grounds for future colonial admissions.

A British phenomenon?

Many saw the entry of British colonies at the League as a form of vote stuffing, yet no other imperial state decided to forward their colonies for accession to compete with Britain. Colonial membership was not largely pushed by the British, but often by Dominion leaders themselves. The Empire, undergoing its early transition to the ‘Commonwealth’ often called ‘the Third British Empire’, had initially pushed for more Dominion autonomy in imperial affairs, seeing them as appendages of White-Anglo-Saxon identity.

The Dominions, many of whom had contributed generously to the First World War, sought an acceleration of rights after the conflict. Membership to the League was thus sought as the early steps towards an independent foreign policy and the recognition of their autonomy, albeit within the larger structure of the British Empire.

The same could not be said for India. With its delegations handpicked by the British bureaucracy ruling India, and its delegations being led by a European, India’s membership was a farce. Indian politicians, like those in the Dominions, also sought greater autonomy after the war, yet there was reluctance to devolve the same levels of governance as had been given to the settler colonies. Membership to the Peace Conference, as well as the League, provided useful symbols of devolution, providing proof of Britain’s pledge towards greater autonomy for India, whilst not relinquishing the reins of power.

Nationalism and Colonial membership

League membership for British colonies could thus be real or farcical, making it a highly contested status for the rapid proliferation of nationalist organisations seeking independence in the wake of the First World War. Irish nationalists in particular had seen League membership as a means to gain international recognition for their insurgent Republic. Yet the United States’ failure to join the organisation, as well as Britain’s predominant position within the organisation made many in Ireland’s liberation struggle more wary of it.

It was in Ireland that the next example of colonial membership emerged. The loophole that allowed the Dominions and India to enter was seen as a unique moment of entry, that would then be sealed for any future colonial applicants. But with the Irish war for independence raging, and seemingly no end in sight to the conflict, an eventual Irish membership in the League was seen by British negotiators as a possible bargaining chip to end the war. Following talks in 1921, Ireland became a ‘Free State’ a status akin to a Dominion, with pledges from Britain to support its accession to the League once it had ratified its treaty with it.

For the new leaders of the Free State, many of whom had grown to loathe the League, the totemic allure of the international recognition it provided became increasingly attractive. The new Dominion was far from an accepted reality, as Republicans rejected the treaty with Britain, plunging Ireland into civil war. For the Free State, League membership would help to shore up the new state’s legitimacy both domestically, as well as internationally, and could provide a shield from Britain if it chose to renege on its agreement. For Irish Republicans, the Free State’s accession was a dangerous international admission of the Irish Dominion’s legitimacy at the expense of dreams of an Irish Republic.

Despite a minor propaganda battle in Geneva between Free-State and Republican agents, the Irish Free-State was admitted in 1923. But its admittance was far from a given. Within weeks of the creation of the Free State in 1921, Britain had declared the independence of another state, Egypt. Although not a British colony, Egypt had been under a form of British Protectorate since the 1870s. Following the Egyptian Revolution in 1919 and Britain’s successful attempts to block an Egyptian delegation from attending the Paris Peace Conference, Britain had sought a means of devolving what powers it could and retaining the necessary in Egypt.

Egypt’s independence in 1921 was nominal at best, with Britain putting the onus on the Egyptian nationalist party, the Wafd, to conclude a treaty with Britain, confirming Britain’s continued presence in Egypt and Sudan. Once again, the idea of Egyptian membership was floated, yet was not forthcoming. Egyptian resistance to concluding a treaty that would legitimise Britain’s occupation was politically impossible. Without the conclusion of such a treaty, however, Britain actively opposed Egyptian membership. This created a paradoxical situation where British Dominions had an easier accession to the League than nominally independent ones like Egypt. Following 15 years of political deadlock, only broken by the threat of fascist Italian encirclement following its invasion of Abyssinia, did Britain and the Wafd reach a compromise. Despite the League’s flagging reputation, Egypt proudly became the last member-state to accede to the ailing organisation in 1937.

The continuation of colonial membership?

The death of the League during the Second World War and its rebirth as the United Nations allowed a chance to reevaluate colonial membership. Britain and the United States were both keen to allow India and the Philippines to join, on the basis that they would soon become independent. The Soviet Union countered this, insisting that two of its Soviet Republics, nominally autonomous regions of the USSR, Ukraine and Belarus, also become full member-states. They would only become sovereign states following the end of the USSR in 1991.

 Using a loophole similar to that drafted to allow India and the Dominions to accede to the League, these four member-states were admitted to the UN based on having attended the San Francisco Conference that founded the UN. This time, the loophole seemed definitively closed, yet the question of membership to states-in-waiting remains a significant one. Even as the UN faces existential challenges, membership remains highly attractive. From Palestine to Kosovo to even Greenland, for those seeking international recognition to become states, UN membership remains key for their independence.