Fifteen Eighty Four

In The King Can Do No Wrong: Blame Games and Power Sharing in Authoritarian Regimes, I ask why some dictators are better than others at avoiding blame for their countries’ problems. Dictators are powerful political leaders who do not need to worry about being removed from power through free and fair elections. In the absence of meaningful electoral constraints, they typically have significant leeway to make decisions and steer policy in their countries. But such power can make a leader vulnerable to backlash and anger if the public is not satisfied with how they are being governed. People tend to blame those with more power for what goes wrong. And despite the lack of competitive elections, dictators still need to keep the public under control if they want to hold onto their job. Repression can only go so far in containing mass opposition, and many dictators are overthrown during periods of popular protest fuelled by widespread discontent. Yet, some of these rulers appear to be more successful than others at convincing the people that their anger should be directed elsewhere. This capacity to avoid blame helps these dictators to sustain their popularity, reducing the likelihood that they are overthrown even if many people are frustrated with how the country is being governed.

The book argues that how dictators share power with other political elites influences their ability to avoid blame. Though their powers are typically significant, not all dictators can dictate decisions as easily as others. Some of them govern alongside elites in cabinets, legislatures, and bureaucracies who possess meaningful influence over the policy process. The more credible it is to the public that these other political actors shape decision-making and are not mere ciphers for the dictator, the easier it is for the dictator to convince people that blame should be directed at these elites, and not at them.

To some extent, dictators can affect the credibility of this delegated responsibility for decision-making. Through institutional reforms that strengthen or weaken the formal powers of elites to provide input and amend policies, or in their choices about whether to appoint officials with the networks and political capital to push back against them, dictators can strategically influence how exposed they are to the public’s anger. As such, the politics of blame can help us understand why some dictators are more willing to share power than others, and at which moments and for which issues this power sharing is more likely to be pronounced. During difficult times or for policy domains where dictators are less confident in their ability to satisfy the public, they should be more likely to empower other political elites to reduce their vulnerability to a potential explosion of mass unrest.

The more effective blame shifting that comes with power sharing can also affect the dictator’s propensity to use repression and facilitate accountability. If people are less likely to blame the dictator when they are aggrieved, the dictator is more likely to permit expressions of discontent. In turn, this anger can identify individuals for the dictator to remove from their positions as a measure of accountability for the public.  

But not all dictators are equally capable of shifting blame by sharing power. The book argues that ruling monarchs (i.e., monarchs who wield substantial decision-making powers) are particularly effective at using this strategy. A downside of power sharing for dictators is that it can give elites more capacity to challenge them from within the regime, ousting them through a coup. However, the fact that it is difficult for non-royal elites to make themselves king reduces this threat for monarchs, allowing them to delegate more credibly with less risk. In addition, monarchs benefit from norms about who is meant to be held accountable for decision-making. If people expect a leader to make decisions and be held responsible for subsequent outcomes, they may blame that leader even if the decision has been delegated credibly to someone else. Presidents, for instance, are typically supposed to be the central leader responsible for governance. By contrast, norms of constitutional monarchy emphasize delegation of decision-making responsibilities to the cabinet and parliament. As a result, when ruling monarchs share power with ministers and parliamentarians, it should align more closely with the public’s expectations about responsibility, increasing the likelihood that they blame these elites.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan provides an important case through which the book explores several of these arguments. Jordan’s kings have wielded (and continue to wield) substantial influence over the political system, but they have also shared power with various institutions, including the cabinet, parliament, and bureaucracy. My interviews with dozens of Jordanian political elites highlighted how ministers and parliamentarians can shape decisions ranging from environmental policy and taxes to religious affairs and other social policies. The interviews also suggested that this power sharing is part of an intentional strategy to protect the king’s reputation with the public.

However, the extent of this power sharing has also varied over time and across issues. The kings have been more willing to cede power over economic and social issues, where the likelihood for contentious politics and popular disgruntlement has often been high, and they have been less keen to share power over foreign affairs and security issues, where they perceive much higher risks of elite-led threats to their regime. As a result, the monarchy’s popular support has, historically, been more sensitive to foreign policy decisions related to issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or relations with foreign powers like the United States. On the other hand, the kings have often been effective at avoiding blame for Jordan’s serious economic challenges. Temporally, the monarchs have tended to step back from decision-making during periods where popular discontent is more pronounced, appointing more independent prime ministers and backing reforms to strengthen the parliament. Through evidence drawn from historical documents, public opinion surveys, and social media data, I show that this power sharing has helped to protect the kings from blame, but also that the kings have been more exposed to anger when they have centralized power more fully in the hands of the palace.   

The book presents a variety of additional evidence from around the world to evaluate how people attribute blame in autocracies and how these attributions affect political outcomes. Internet search data show that people pay relatively more attention to dictators when they share less power, and data from surveys suggest that discontent with the economy is associated more strongly with lower support for dictators who are perceived to dominate decision-making. Analysis of data from dozens of autocracies also indicates that dictators are more likely to face popular challenges to their rule during economic crises if they have delegated less credibly. These patterns align with the argument that how dictators share power affects how likely people are to blame them for bad outcomes, and thus how exposed they are to mass opposition. The analysis also shows that dictators who share more power tend to rely on repression less and to replace cabinet officials more, implying that the ability to avoid blame reduces the need to suppress discontent while facilitating more accountability.

Are ruling monarchs better positioned than dictatorial presidents or prime ministers to shift blame by sharing power? Here, the book focuses on the Arab world, highlighting how authoritarian presidents typically delegated less credibly than monarchs to their cabinets and legislatures, while also facing higher expectations that they govern and be held accountable for their countries’ outcomes. In the years leading up to the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, these differences led to growing anger against presidents personally, whereas monarchs were less exposed to blame even when their countries struggled with similar economic and political challenges. As a result, when mass opposition ignited across the region in late 2010 and early 2011, protesters turned on their presidents but not on their kings. Analysis of cross-national data shows that this pattern reflects a more general advantage of ruling monarchs since the 1950s. When the people are angry and mobilized, monarchs are less likely than other types of dictators to be overthrown.

Through this focus on why some dictators are better than others at avoiding blame, the book provides important insights into the politics of authoritarian rule. For one, it sheds light on the puzzling resilience of ruling monarchies in the modern period. Despite their apparent anachronism, these royal rulers have been relatively effective at maintaining popular support and holding onto power. More broadly, the book helps to explain why dictators can succeed at keeping the public on their side even as their regimes perform badly. Yet, the findings also highlight how people living in these political systems think in nuanced ways about issues such as responsibility and accountability. To further our understanding of politics under dictatorship, it is important to continue developing accounts of why the people choose to support or oppose authoritarian rulers.